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Abstract 
In “The Myth of the Rational Voter” Brian Caplan shows that voters entertain systematically 
biased beliefs on a number of essential issues of economic policy and concludes that this leads 
democracies to choose bad policies. We introduce the psychological concept of mental mod-
els to address voters’ naive reasoning about the economy and thereby explain the persistent 
bias in beliefs. Next, we develop a game-theoretical model to show that this does not auto-
matically lead to bad policy choices. The model formalizes Caplan’s thought experiment No. 
4 by introducing endogenous party valence to a model of probabilistic voting. In so doing, we 
provide an investigation of when good policies are chosen in democracy. Based on our find-
ings, we discuss the impact of different political institutions on economic outcomes.  
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1. Introduction 
In his provocative monograph “The Myth of the Rational Voter – Why Democracies Choose 
Bad Policies”, Bryan Caplan (2007) shows that voters entertain biased beliefs about a number 
of fundamental economic (policy) issues. Among other things, they massively underestimate 
the benefits from market exchange and foreign trade. Drawing on concepts of social psychol-
ogy and focussing on the dynamics of social cognition, Bénabou (2008) shows that biased 
beliefs on important political issues like the optimal scope of markets and government can be 
persistent because it is individually rational to ignore contradicting signals. Caplan concludes 
that Condorcet’s Jury Theorem does not apply, therefore. Instead, democratic mechanisms of 
preference aggregation lead to bad policy choices compared to the case where voters’ beliefs 
are unbiased. He touches on a number of factors that might improve the policy choices but 
dismisses them as too weak (e.g. Caplan 2007: chapt. 6 and 7). We argue that he may be over-
hasty in his conclusion. More specifically, we challenge his thought experiment 4 in which he 
argues that even restrospective voting based on the government’s economic performance is 
insufficient to set incentives for parties to choose good economic policies.
1
 
  The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we relate our approach and the 
contribution of the paper to the existing literature. In section 3, we provide a model of party 
competition that introduces the concepts of mental models and endogenous valence to the 
spatial theory of voting. Section 4 provides a game-theoretic analysis which demonstrates that 
democratic party competition may lead to good policy choices even when voters’ beliefs are 
biased. Section 5 discusses the implications of our findings for the performance of different 
political institutions and concludes.  
2. Relation to the Literature 
The question whether “democracy”—in the sense of popular government—produces good 
outcomes is old. Plato and Aristotle distinguished a “good” and a “bad” form of popular gov-
ernment: in the good form leaders are interested in common welfare, whereas the bad is a de-
praved form, characterized by (solely) self-interested leaders (e.g. Inglis and Robertson 2006: 
6). The public choice literature re-introduced the perspective that politicians, parties, and gov-
ernments are, respectively consist of individuals who are primarily self-interested and adapt to 
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incentives (e.g. Brennan 2008; Grant 2008; Shughart 2006). It has been exactly this drop of 
the implicit orthodox faith in benevolent political institutions that made the power of the pub-
lic choice revolution (e.g. Shughart and Tollison 2005). Rent-seeking and other activities of 
bureaucrats, politicians and other interest groups cause inefficient democratic outcomes (e.g. 
Stokes 1963; Niskanen 1975; Tollison 1982; Shughart and Razzolini 2001). Thus, institutions 
like taxes or tariffs, and other interventions, are not created to be socially efficient, but serve 
the interests of those with the bargaining power to create them (e.g. North 1994: 360). Fol-
lowing this insight, a lot of economic policy failures have been explained by failures in the 
political sphere. Democratic elections, therefore, do not, per se, generate efficient outcomes, 
as Caplan states. However, a lot of authors are less pessimistic than Caplan. To overcome the 
political failures at the side of politicians and of lobbying, optimal remuneration of politicians 
(e.g. Besley 2004; Poutvaara and Takalo 2007), different forms of incentive contracts (e.g. 
Gersbach 2004, 2007a; Gersbach and Liessem 2007), term limits (e.g. Smart and Sturm 
2004), and constitutional rules have been proposed (e.g. Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Gers-
bach 2005; Gersbach, forthcoming).  
  While the public choice literature primarily emphasizes on opportunistic politicians, 
bureaucrats or interest groups to explain poor policy outcomes, Caplan (2007) shifts the focus 
to the role of voters and points at their biased beliefs as an additional source of inefficiency. 
In line with this emphasis, Beilharz (2005) and Beilharz and Gersbach (2004), for instance, 
demonstrate how democracies may vote into crises, if voters do not include general equilib-
rium effects in reasoning about minimum wage regulation. As a consequence, unemployment 
and tax burden constantly rise and the economy moves toward crisis. Only if significant crises 
establish, voters will adjust opinions—and the bad policy may be reversed. Combining prob-
lems at the politicians’ side and the voters’ side, Gersbach (2007b) shows that if voters are 
unsure about the competence and the preferences of politicians, democracy will also lead to 
weak policies. He deduces a “paradox of competence” where welfare rises when voters disre-
gard the competence of candidates and solely base their voting decision on their belief 
whether the candidate is concerned about the long-term effects of his decisions.  
  In this paper, we assume that beliefs remain biased even if economic outcomes are 
poor as it is implied by Caplan’s results. We explain the persistent bias towards inadequate 
policies by voters who entertain over-simplified and biased mental models of the economy 
and do not have an incentive to learn about the correct mental model. At the same time, the 
empirical literature on vote-popularity (VP) functions shows that voters account for the eco-
nomic performance of governments when deciding whether to support the current incumbent  
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or vote for a change (e.g. Paldam 2004; Nannestad and Paldam 1994). Incumbents who man-
age to achieve good macroeconomic results are more likely to be re-elected than incumbents 
performing poorly. We interpret this as a rudimentary form of learning in the sense that voters 
update their beliefs concerning the incumbent’s competence in economic policy issues. If his 
economic performance is good (bad), he is considered competent (incompetent). Thus, we 
endogenize the valence of parties and candidates. In a world with endogenous valence, parties 
and politicians who want to be re-elected have to take account of the valence perception of the 
voters. There is a trade-off between choosing policy platforms to maximize votes in the short 
run and building up valence to attract more votes in the future. Similar to Zakharov (2008), 
we show that parties strategically choose their platform in order to build up valence. 
  Our basic question is the following: When does democratic party competition generate 
good policy outcomes and when will policies be poor yet populist in equilibrium. Having 
provided this insight, we better understand when promising instruments like incentive con-
tracts, or others, are required and what alternative instruments could be. 
  Very similar to Gersbach (2003, 2004), Gersbach and Liessem (2007), Liessem 
(2008), and Müller (2007) we use a model where parties have the option to choose a socially 
beneficial policy or a bad populist platform. Additionally, we provide an explanation for why 
voters stick to their biased beliefs. Moreover, we do not distinguish between “populists” and 
“statesman”, respectively “policy success-seekers”. We assume that parties are office-seekers 
and maximize the chances of being (re)elected over a particular span of time, which poten-
tially covers several elections. In this sense we assume that parties are populist. Similar to 
Müller (2007) we demonstrate that despite purely populist parties socially beneficial out-
comes can arise in equilibrium. Thereby, we challenge the pessimistic conclusion made by 
Caplan (2007).  
3.   The Basic Model 
3.1  The Voting Decision 
Let there be a finite number of N voters. Voter turnout is assumed to be 100 %. The utility of 
a single voter i in period t is given by a utility function  
(,) it i it t UU y a =  (1) 
with yit being voter i’s income in period t and at an indicator or vector of indicators of macro-
economic performance, e.g. the change of the unemployment rate, economic growth, the level 




 individual income  it y  and, additionally, by the macroeconomic performance of the econ-
omy (or the society as a whole). Both determinants can be influenced by economic policy. Let 
ηt represent the multidimensional policy vector in period t, in which each row represents a 
certain policy field and the value of ηt in a certain row states which policy instrument is ap-
plied. For instance, one row could represent personal income taxation and the value of ηt in 
this row states whether the current government applies a dual income tax, a classical income 
tax, a flat tax or some other concept. Another row may represent wage policy and the value 
states whether or not there is a minimum wage. Depending on individual circumstances, dif-
ferent voters’ income yit may obviously be influenced by a given ηt in different ways, for in-
stance, due to tax burden. Next to this direct effect, ηt also has an indirect impact on yit by 
influencing the overall macroeconomic performance at which in turn has a direct impact on 
yit. Moreover, yit depends on the policies pursued in connection to voter i’s individual circum-
stances of living, e.g. the sector in which he is employed, his qualification etc. The income yit 
is thus determined as follows:  
() () , it i t t t yy a η η =  (2) 
Overall, utility is determined by: 
() () () () ,, i t ii tttt tt UU y a a η ηη =  (3) 
Due to the complexity of the economy and the fact that voters lack incentives to explore it in 
detail, the functional form of the functions at and yit is unknown to the individual voter. Vot-
ers use their mental models in mental simulations to make predictions concerning the ex-
pected values of yit and at depending on ηt (e.g. Johnson-Laird 1983; Bischoff 2007, 2008). 
The mental model  i mm  can be thought of as a function assigning certain estimates for yit and 
at to certain policy vectors, that is, 
2 : 
K
i mm →    , with K being the number of policy dimen-
sions in  t η . Estimated values are labelled by a hat, e.g.,  ˆit a represents the macroeconomic per-
formance of the economy in period t, estimated by the mental model of voter i: 
                                                 
2
 It will be convenient to refer to the voters as ‘he’ with no implied value judgement attached to this designation.  
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() () { } ˆˆ ,( ) it t it t i t ya m m η ηη =    (4) 
The mental model determines the voters’ politico-economic view of the world. The policy 
platform  ηi which—in the eyes of voter i—is the best, maximizes his utility 
() () () () ˆ ˆˆ , it t i it t it t UU y a η ηη = :  
{}




=    (5) 
For reasons of simplicity, we assume that there are two competing political parties A and B 
which offer policy platform 
A
t η , respectively 
B
t η . In each election of term t, voters can choose 
between these two parties’ platforms. The individual voter uses his mental model to estimate 
the consequences of the proposed policy platforms with respect to yit and at, and thus for Uit. 
That is, the voter compares the two  ( ) ˆˆ jj
it it t UU η = , , j AB = . Other things equal, voter i fa-
vours the party for which the estimated utility is larger.  
  In addition, we assume that voters account for the macroeconomic performance of the 
incumbent party, i.e. the party in government in term t-1. This assumption is backed by the 
literature on so-called vote-and-popularity (VP) functions (e.g. Paldam 2004; Nannestad and 
Paldam 1994). It shows that voters hold the government responsible for the macroeconomic 
performance, in particular for the unemployment rate and GDP-growth. They punish govern-
ments for bad economic results and reward them for good performance even if their individ-
ual prospects are not affected (e.g. Paldam 2004). By introducing this empirical result to our 
model, we endogenize the concept of valence (e.g. Zakharov 2008). Following Stokes (1963), 
valence refers to party or candidate characteristics, other than policy platforms, that codeter-
mine voting behavior (e.g. Groseclose 2001). In our model, a party’s valence reflects the de-
gree to which voters consider the party capable of producing good economic outcomes (e.g. 
Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000). Incumbents who managed to achieve good macroeconomic 
results are considered competent and thus are assigned a high valence. The fact that voters are 
unable to predict the correct macroeconomic figures—as e.g. pointed out by Caplan (2007: 
chapt. 6)—does not challenge the empirical result of the literature on VP-functions. Nor does 
it challenge our above-named assumption, because the latter merely states that the voters, ex 
post, can tell good economic results from poor ones.   
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  We assume that all voters basically assign the same valence to a particular party, for 
simplicity. Then, party j’s valence is determined in the following way: 
() ( )
1
/ if party is in power in period




aa j t η
ψ η +
⎧ ⎪ = ⎨
⎪ ⎩
 (6) 
where  a  is a constant benchmark value of the voters for the macroeconomic performance. 
This establishes a dynamic link between period t and t+1.
3
 
The individual voting decision depends on the valence of the incumbent and the oppo-
sition party as well as on the policy platforms offered by them. Applying the concept of prob-
abilistic voting yields the following expression for the probability 
j
it π  that voter i votes for 
party j in term t:  
ˆˆ (, , , )
jj j j j
it i t t it it fU U πψ ψ
−− =   (7) 
























We assume the non-negativity and the adding up conditions to hold:  
1[ 0 , 1 ]
jj
it it ππ











− = ˆ ˆ , voter i is indifferent between the two parties and thus  1
2
j
it π = . 
However, if  () ( ) ˆˆ jj j j
it t it t UU η η
−− = , voter i will rather vote for the party that has more valence, 
so that  1
2
j
it π <  if 
jj
tt ψ ψ
− < , and vice versa. Being aware of the model uncertainty, voters vote 
for party j if the expected utility of 
j η is lower than the expected utility from 
j η
− , if party j 
has a sufficiently high valence advance.  
  As a single vote is very rarely decisive and learning is costly, we assume that a voter 
does not have any incentive to learn about the complex system the economy represents. 
Hence, the mental models of the voters are not updated. This assumption is well backed by 
the empirical research on mental models (e.g. DiSessa 1982; Suen 2004). Especially mental 
models of social and political phenomena prove to be stable. Very rarely do individuals, even 
experts, question their mental model even when its predictions prove to be well off the mark 
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 This form of valence updating represents a very simple rule of learning which is backed by the empricial find-
ings of the VP-function research showing that voters have a short memory (e.g. Paldam 2004).   
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(e.g. Tetlock 1989, 1999). Bénabou (2008) provides an alternative theoretical explanation for 
the stability of mental models based on a model of belief formation and voting that draws on 
concepts from social psychology.  
3.2 The Behaviour of Parties 
Summing across all N voters yields the expected number of votes party j can expect to win in 
election t:   
()
1
ˆˆ ,, , [ 0 , ]
N
jj jj j j
ttt i ti t i t
i
UU N ψψ π
−−
=
Π =     ∈ ∑  (10) 
We assume that both parties A and B are utility maximizing with the utility from being in of-
fice for one term is 1 and from not being in office is 0. Hence, both parties are assumed to be 
office-seeking and maximize the expected terms in office over a particular span of time, la-
belled 
j
t Θ . We assume that both parties have an equal time-horizon, denoted by T. Then, the 
expected utility of party j in election t is given by its probability to win the election, 
j
t Π . We 









Θ= Π ∑  (11) 














   (12) 
4.   Party Competition 
For simplicity, there are only two possible policy platforms {ηI, ηII} from which the parties 
can choose.
4
 Though, ultimately, nobody knows exactly the correct mental model, we assume 
that  II η  is an adequate, good policy platform and  I η  an inadequate, bad platform. The empiri-
cal findings of Caplan (2007) suggest that voters entertain biased beliefs about a number of 
fundamental economic (policy) issues. Therefore, we assume that the mental models of a ma-
jority of voters assert  () () ˆˆ
it I i it II UU η η    for all t, despite the fact that the opposite is true (see 
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 Suppose, for instance, that there are a couple of policy proposals of “experts” that reduce the otherwise infi-
nitely high number of possible platforms (Beilharz 2005: 90), but that these policy proposals still are alternatives 
to each other.  
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also Beilharz 2005; Beilharz and Gersbach 2004). Only a minority of voters apply mental 
models that yield the reverse preference ordering.  
  For simplicity, we assume complete information at the parties’ side.
5
 Since policy plat-
form  ηII will yield superior economic outcomes, if pursued, the parties know that 
at+1(ηII) > at+1(ηI). Let  () tI aa η <  and  ( ) tI I aa η > . Consequently, a government will be at-
tributed a higher valence in t+1, if it realizes ηII in t (compared to offering ηI). That is, plat-
form ηI is a popular but harmful policy and ηII is a good but temporarily less popular policy. 
Hence, if a party wins the election in period t and pursues good policy platform ηII, it will be 
allocated valence 
j
t1 1 + Ψ> , and if a party wins the election in period t and pursues populist 
platform ηI, it will be allocated valence 
j
t1 1 + Ψ < .  
  We give the model more structure by assuming that a party’s probability of winning an 
election can be separated into two additive effects. First, the probability of being elected de-
pends on the competing platforms 
j
t η  and 
j
t
− η . Second, the probability depends on the valence 
perceptions of the voters. Therefore, we re-define the function for the number of expected 
votes in election t by the following form: 
  () ( ) ( )
jj j j j j j j j
tt t t t t t t t ,,, f g [ 0 , 1 ]
−− − − Πη ηΨΨ = η − η + Ψ − Ψ ∈     (13) 
with   ()
1
2 f0≡          ( 1 4 )  
   ()
1
II I2 ff η− η ≡ +         ( 1 5 )  
   ()
1
II I 2 ff η −η ≡−        ( 1 6 )  
   () g0 0 ≡          ( 1 7 )  
   ()
jj
tt g0 g
− Ψ− Ψ > ≡         ( 1 8 )  
   ()
jj
tt g0 g
− Ψ− Ψ < ≡ −        ( 1 9 )  
That is, we reinterpret the function of expected votes as a real valued function on [ ] 0,1 , so 
that it expresses the expected fraction of total votes N . Hence, we restrict the function value 
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 Parties face substantial incentives to learn because their stakes are high. Thus, we expect them to be informed 
about the expected economic impact of different policies and identify good policies.  
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to move within interval [ ] 0,1  and assume 12 f g 1 + +≤. Variable f measures the additional 
fraction of votes (beyond 12) stemming from proposing platform ηI when the other party 
proposes platform ηII, and g the additional fraction of votes stemming from the comparative 
advantage of valence. This implies that the valence term has three possible values: 1, 1+Ψ 
and 1−Ψ, with  tI I a( )a Ψ= η . As the advantage in support of one party must be equal to the 
disadvantage of the other, we subtract the corresponding variable, if a party suffers a disad-
vantage in one of these respects.
6
  
  Party competition is then modelled as a non-cooperative dynamic game. Besides the 
repeated elections, the dynamics result from the fact that the valence of parties in t depends on 
which party won the election in t-1 and the policy platform pursued by it (endogenous va-
lence). Figure 1 presents the structure of the game. The four stages game described in Figure 
1 is analyzed by the parties as a T times repeated game. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
If both parties are allocated the same valence in the first period, we obtain 
A
t Π  = 
B
t Π  when-
ever both parties choose the same policy platform. In the other cases, the party which chooses 
the popular platform ηI has a higher probability of winning the election. Initially both parties 
can have equal valence or one party can have a valence advantage. Deducing expected pay-
offs, we must differentiate between the two possible states “party A wins the election” and 
“party A loses the election”. They occur with probability  1
A B
tt Π =− Π, respectively 
(1 )
A B
tt −Π =Π . This differentiation is necessary because the valence parameters for period 2 
differ depending on which state emerges, since voters update their valence parameter  1
j
t ψ + .  
 If  11
A B
tt ψ ψ ++ > , party A will have a larger probability of winning when both parties 
choose the same policy platform. The critical situation for choosing good policy ηII is given 
by ( ;
AB
tI I tI η ηη η == ). If in this situation 
A
t Π  ≥ 
B
t Π , party A will maintain a good chance of 
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(, , 1 , 1 ) (, , 1 , 1 )
jj j j j jj j j j
ttt t t ttt t t ηη ψ ψ ηη ψ ψ
−− −− Π> = = Π= <  
That is, it makes no difference of whether the incumbent has the valence advantage for having applied ηII or the 
opposition party has the advantage because the incumbent applied ηI . This implies  ( )( ) tI tI I aa 2 a η+ η = .  
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winning when choosing ηII, even if party B offers the popular ηI. The crucial question is 
whether  11
22 fg −+≥ holds, that is, whether  gf >  and thus the advantage of valence out-
weighs the disadvantage of proposing the less popular platform. However, regardless of 
whether this condition is satisfied, offering ηII will result in short-term losses in utility, be-
cause the expected share of votes in election t is always higher when offering ηI.  
As the government pursues a good or a bad policy, from election 2 on, we only have to 
differentiate between two possible starting situations for party competition: One is character-
ized by  11
A B
tt ψ ψ ++ >  (situation A
+), the other one by  11
A B
tt ψ ψ + + <  (situation A
-).  
Finally, we accommodate Caplan with two assumptions: (i) We set the tie-breaking rule 
such that if a party is indifferent between the two platforms, it will choose the populist plat-
form  I η ; (ii) we assume that parties commit to the platform proposed in the campaign and 
exclude “cheap talk” strategies. Such strategies would destroy their credibility and the capac-
ity to commit to policy platforms in the future which in turn causes losses in votes (e.g., Ara-
gonès et al. 2007). Given our assumption (ii), parties cannot play the populist platform in the 
campaign and pursue the good policy in order to build up valence. If they could, good policies 
would occur more often. In this sense, we investigate a “worst case”-scenario.  
4.1 When Parties Have Short-Term Objectives 










η η  for the payoff of party B, 
with  { } ,0, x AA
−+ = denoting the initial valence difference, given the proposed platforms 
A η  
and 
B η . If we analyze the case where the two parties compete only in one election, we have 
the following one-shot simultaneous-move election game, represented in normal-form: 
 
   B 




, Pη η , 
II
B,x
, Pη η  
II I
A,x








, Pη η , 
II I
B,x
, Pη η II II
A,x




Game 1: One-shot election game  
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Lemma 1: In Game 1 () T1 =  the unique Nash equilibrium (henceforth abbreviated by 
NE) is given by actions




Ax Bx PP ηη ηη , irrespective of valence realization 
{ } ,0, x AA
−+ = . 
Proof:  If  x0 = , the respective payoffs are ( ) ( ) ( )
I I I I II II II II
A,0 B,0 A,0 B,0 11
,, , , 22 P, P P , P , ηη ηη η η η η == , 
() ()
II I II I
A,0 B,0 11
,, 22 P, P f ,f ηη ηη =+ − and () ( )
II I II I
A,0 B,0 11
,, 22 P, P f ,f ηη ηη = −+ . If x A
+ = , the payoff vectors 
are given by () ( ) ()
I I I I II II II II
A,A B,A A,A B,A 11
,, ,, 22 P, P P, P g ,g
++ ++




ηη ηη = 
()
11
22 fg , fg ++ −−  and () ()
II I II I
A,A B,A 11
,, 22 P, P f g ,f g
++
ηη ηη = −+ +− . And if x A
− = , payoffs are given 
by  () () ()
I I I I II II II II
A,A B,A A,A B,A 11
,, ,, 22 P, P P, P g ,g
−− −−




ηη ηη =  ( )
11
22 fg , fg + −− +  and 
() ()
II I II I
A,A B,A 11
,, 22 P, P f g ,f g
−−
ηη ηη =− − + +. In all three scenarios it holds that only if both parties 
choose platform ηI, none of the two parties will have an incentive to deviate unilaterally.
  ⁫ 
Suppose both parties’ time-horizon only spans the next election. It follows that Game 1 is 
played repeatedly in subsequent elections. Both parties and voters observe the outcome of the 
preceding elections before the next election begins. Then, Game 1 is a stage game that is 
played on and on. We obtain: 
Proposition 1: Suppose parties have a time horizon of one election (T=1). Then, the 
finitely or infinitely repeated Game 1 has the unique subgame-perfect NE with actions 
() II , ηη and payoffs ()
II II
A,x B,x
,, P, P ηη ηη  in all elections.  
Proof: According to Lemma 1 every single stage game’s unique NE is () II , ηη , regard-
less of the preceding stages’ outcomes. It directly follows that this NE of the stage game is the 
unique subgame-perfect NE of the repeated stage game (e.g. Gibbons 1992: 84).
8
   ￿  
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Hence, even in a dynamic game with endogenous valence, where a party can win a valence 
advantage by realizing good policy platform  II η , parties will always propose populist plat-
form  I η  in elections. Platform II η , although known as the economically better policy, is never 
chosen in equilibrium. As claimed by Caplan (2007) democracy would be characterized by 
weak, populist policy.  
4.3   When Parties Have Long-Term Objectives 
4.3.1  The Two-Elections Case 
Let us now alternatively assume that parties have an inter-temporal objective function and 
maximize the number of expected votes in the next two elections (T=2). Then, the corre-
sponding payoffs are simply the sum of the payoffs from the T =2 stage games, as described 
by equation (11). The game is described by Figure 1 with T=2.  
  Having objectives beyond the next election, the parties care about the valence effect 
for the second election. We have to distinguish three possible scenarios: in the first election, 
party A has a valence advantage (A
+), so that  ( )
AB
tt gg Ψ −Ψ = ; party A has a valance disad-
vantage in the first election (A
-), so that  ( )
AB
tt gg Ψ −Ψ =− ; or both parties have equal initial 
valence (0), so that  ()
AB
tt g0 Ψ −Ψ = . Solving the game by backwards induction, we obtain: 
Proposition 2: Suppose scenario 0. 
(a) If gf > , the unique subgame perfect NE is ( ) II II I I ,,, η ηηη. 
(b) If gf ≤ , the unique subgame perfect NE is ( ) IIII ,,, η ηηη . 
Proof: See Appendix.  
If no party has a valence advantage, we obtain the obvious result that a party proposes the 
good platform  II η  as long as the dynamic expected gain of votes of doing so, given by g, is 
higher than the expected loss of votes of doing so, given by f. Only if this is the case, a party 
will propose the good instead of the populist platform. It is clear, however, that in the last 
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 In the infinitely repeated game scenario, we assume that the presumptions of the Folk Theorem are satisfied, 
such that the discount factor is sufficiently close to one (e.g. Friedman 1971).   
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election no party will choose the economically better platform. This follows from the logic of 
Lemma 1: given biased beliefs of voters toward the bad policy, there is simply no point in 
choosing the better policy, if there is no next election to take into account.  
Next, we turn to the scenarios with unequal initial valence perceptions.  
Proposition 3: Suppose scenario A
+. 
(a) If fg ( 1 2 g ) <−, the unique NE is ( ) II II I I ,,, η ηηη. 
(b) If g(1 2g) f g(1 2g) −≤ <+, the unique NE is ( ) I IIII ,,, η ηηη. 
(c) If fg ( 1 2 g ) ≥+, the unique NE is ( ) IIII ,,, ηηηη . 
Proof: See Appendix.  
Proposition 4: Suppose scenario A
-. 
(a) If fg ( 1 2 g ) <−, the unique NE is ( ) II II I I ,,, η ηηη. 
(b) If g(1 2g) f g(1 2g) −≤ <+, the unique NE is ( ) II III ,,, η ηηη. 
(c) If fg ( 1 2 g ) ≥+, the unique NE is ( ) IIII ,,, ηηηη . 
Proof: See Appendix.  
Given the symmetry of the game, it is intuitively clear that the equilibria of scenario A
+ and 
A
- are identical, with the exception that case (b) is mirror-inverted: if party A has a disadvan-
tage, party B has the corresponding advantage. Compared to scenario 0, the area in the (f, g)-
space where both parties choose ηII is smaller as is the area where both choose ηI (see Figure 
2). In addition, there exists an area in which the party with the valence-advantage offers ηII 
while the disadvantaged opponent party offers ηI. Figure 3 maps the three relevant areas in 
the two-dimensional (f, g)-space. It shows that the area where both parties choose ηII is larger 
than in scenario A
+ (and mirror-inverted in A
-). At the same time, the new area where one 
party chooses ηII  while the other party chooses ηI in A
+ or A
- covers part of the area where ηI 
is chosen by both parties in scenario 0.  
[Figure 2 and 3 about here]  
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In repeated games, scenario 0 may serve as a theoretical starting point but becomes irrelevant 
in our model once the first policy platform has been pursued. In the long run, Proposition 3 
and 4 are relevant. Accordingly, parties with a time-horizon of T = 2 will always choose ηII if 
f < g(1-2g). If g(1-2g) ≤ f < g(1+2g), the party with the valence-advantage will always offer 
ηII while the other party offers ηI. Finally, if f ≥ g(1+2g), both parties will offer ηI.  
4.3.2  The three-elections case 
The analysis above showed that a shift in the parties’ time horizon from T = 1 to T = 2 leads 
office-seeking parties to adopt the adequate policy platform ηII even at the expense of short-
term losses in votes. In this section, we show that a further increase to T = 3 widens the area 
in the (f, g)-space for which ηII is chosen by both parties. Here, parties will choose ηII in t = 1 
if the resulting increase in utility from an increased chance of starting in t = 2 with a valence 
advantage outweighs the short-term losses in votes in t = 1. From party A’s point of view, the 
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+ Θ⋅ , respectively 
A
2 (,A )
− Θ⋅ , represents the probability of being elected in elec-
tions t = 2 and t = 3, when having a valence advantage, respectively disadvantage, in election 
2 (see equation (11)). These depend on the policy choices of both parties in these elections, 
which in turn depend on f and g. Given that the remaining game is a two-elections game, 
Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 informs us about the respective equilibria values of 
A
2 (,A )




− Θ⋅ .  
Proposition 5: Suppose scenario 0. 
(a) If fg < , both parties choose the good policy platform  II η  in election 1. 
(b) If fg ≥ , both parties choose the populist platform  I η   in election 1. 
Proof: See Appendix.   
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The subgame perfect NE are summarized in Corollary 1.  
Corollary 1: Suppose scenario 0. 
(a) If f g(1 2g) <−, the unique subgame-perfect NE is ( ) II II II II I I ,,,,, η ηηηηη. 
(b) If g(1 2g) f g − ≤<, with probability  1
2  the subgame-perfect NE is 
() I II II IIII ,,,,, ηηηηηη and ( ) I II III III ,,,,, η ηηηηη with counter-probability  1
2 . 
(c) If g f g(1 2g) ≤< + , with probability  1
2  the subgame-perfect NE is 
() III IIII ,,,,, ηηηηηη and ( ) IIII III ,,,,, ηηηηηη with counter-probability  1
2 . 
(d) If f g(1 2g) ≥+, the unique subgame-perfect NE is ( ) IIIIII ,,,,, η ηηηηη. 
Proof: See Appendix.  
It remains to investigate the case where one party starts with an initial advantage in the va-
lence perception of the voters. 






− < , both parties choose the good policy platform  II η  in election 1. 
(b) If 
(1 2g) (1 2g)
(1 g) (1 g) gf g
−+
−+ ≤< , party A chooses the good policy platform  II η  in election 





+ ≥ , both parties choose the populist platform  I η  in election 1. 
(d) In election 1, outcome ( ) II I , η η  never occurs in subgame-perfect NE. 
Proof: See Appendix.  
The relevant areas of the (f, g)-space are shown in Figure 4. We obtain: 
[Figure 4 about here] 
Corollary 2: Suppose scenario A
+. 




(1 g) g(1 2g) f g
−
− −≤ < , the subgame-perfect NE is ( ) I II II IIII ,,,,, η ηηηηη with 
probability  1
2 g +  and  ( ) I II III III ,,,,, η ηηηηη with counter-probability  1
2 g − . 
(c) If 
(1 2g) (1 2g)
(1 g) (1 g) gf g
−+
−+ ≤< , the unique subgame-perfect NE is ( ) I III IIII ,,,,, ηηηηηη. 
(d) If 
(1 2g)
(1 g) gf g ( 1 2 g )
+
+ ≤< + , the subgame-perfect NE is ( ) III IIII ,,,,, η ηηηηη with 
probability  1
2 g −  and ( ) IIII III ,,,,, η ηηηηη with counter-probability  1
2 g + . 
(e) If fg ( 1 2 g ) ≥+, the unique subgame-perfect NE is ( ) IIIIII ,,,,, ηηηηηη. 
Proof: See Appendix.  
Note that party A represents the party with initial valence advantage. That is, in scenario A
- 
party B and party A switch parts, and Proposition 6 and Corollary 2 hold mirror-inverted. 
Again, in the long run, Proposition 6 is relevant. Accordingly, parties with a time-




− < . If 
(1 2g) (1 2g)
(1 g) (1 g) gf g
−+
−+ ≤< , the party with the valence-advantage will always offer ηII, while the other 




+ ≥ , both parties will offer ηI.  
Figures 4 and 5 map the relevant areas for T = 2 and T = 3. We can see that the area of 
(f, g)-combinations for which both parties offer ηII is larger for T = 3 than in the game with 
T = 2. Given that offering this policy platform is an investment in a higher expected valence 
for the consecutive elections, this result is not surprising. It is, however, surprising to see that 
simultaneously the area for which both parties offer ηI in the first election has also become 
larger. Consequently, we see in Figure 5 that the area where the good policy is chosen by both 
parties in the first election increases from the left, but that the area where both parties choose 
the populist platform in the first election increases from the right, too. The latter result is par-
ticularly counter-intuitive for the party with the valence advantage. It has a higher ex ante 
probability of winning the next election and should choose ηII to keep this advantage, rather 
than put it at risk with the high probability of (½ + f + g) by offering the populist platform ηI 
in the first election.  
[Figure 5 about here]  
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Finally, one remark on robustness is apposite. It could be argued that party competition 
should be modelled as sequential- instead of simultaneous-move game. For instance, because 
the government party, as incumbent, can or has to move first. However, our results are based 
on strictly dominant strategies for both parties. That is, the platform chosen is optimal irre-
spective of the other party’s platform. Therefore, knowing the other parties platform does not 
change the chosen strategy. It follows that our results will remain valid if party competition 
would be modelled as sequential-move game. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Starting from Caplan’s pessimistic view on the policy outcome in democracy, we provide a 
game-theoretic model of party competition. Voters entertain biased beliefs and inadequate 
policies are more popular than adequate policies. The model endogenizes the parties’ valence 
which is updated depending on the parties’ past macroeconomic performance. This assump-
tion is backed by the empirical literature on VP-functions. We show that political parties face 
incentives to apply less popular but good policy platforms even though these have less intui-
tive appeal to the voters than alternative more popular platforms. This contradicts Caplan’s 
claim that, given biased beliefs of voters, democracy inevitably leads to poor policies. The 
essential condition for the existence of incentives to realize good policy is that the advantage 
in valence in t+1 from applying good policy platform ηII in t outweighs the losses in votes 
from proposing ηII in t. Good policies are more likely (a) the less popular the inadequate men-
tal model is among voters (i.e. the lower f), (b) the more voters account for the parties’ past 
economic performance and (c) the less polarized the distribution of mental models is (i.e. the 
larger g). This result provides additional rationale for the crucial influence of e.g. free press, 
literacy and education in general on the policy outcome in democracy. In addition, our model 
is in line with other tools proposed to improve the design of democracy, for instance, im-
proved remuneration of politicians (e.g. Poutvaara and Takalo 2007) and competition of par-
ties for incentive contracts (e.g. Gersbach 2005). These steps would increase variable g, too, if 
we interpret this variable more broadly as “dynamic advantage in the next election”. Hence, in 
our model, applying these tools would increase the area in which good policies are chosen in 
equilibrium. 
  As might be expected, the parties’ time horizon proves to be of crucial importance for 
the quality of policy choices in our model. As the parties’ time horizon widens, the range of 
constellations where sufficient incentives exist for choosing good policies grows. At the same 
time and somewhat surprisingly, the range of constellations for which populist policy plat- 
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forms are the rational choice for both parties becomes larger as well. For some constellations, 
a long time horizon promotes good policy choices while it prevents them for other constella-
tions. The question which constellations are more likely is essentially an empirical one. In any 
case, Caplan (2007) may be overhasty when dismissing the possibility of good democratic 
policy choices when voters’ beliefs are biased.  
  Our model only draws a crude picture of the political institutions underlying policy 
choices. Nevertheless, we can draw interesting conclusions with respect to the economic per-
formance of different political institutions. The essential line of reasoning is that institutions 
determine the time horizon T of political parties and thereby the incentives to offer economi-
cally superior yet unpopular policies. First, democracies in which the supply side of policies is 
dominated by political parties operate with a larger time horizon than democracies in which 
the individual candidates, possibly even without any party affiliation, dominate policy supply. 
The reason is that parties will discipline their candidates and force them to account for the 
valence-effects of their policy choices even in their last term in office. Assuming that the (f, 
g) constellation is favourable to good policy choices, party-dominated democracies should 
thus witness better economic policies, because the relevant actors on the supply side face 
stronger incentives to invest in a higher valence by offering economically superior yet un-
popular policy platforms. Given that party control is generally stronger in parliamentary sys-
tems than in presidential systems, we expect, all other things equal, the latter to operate at a 
lower T and thus witness poorer economic results. The empirical evidence by Persson and 
Tabellini (1999; 2003: chapt. 7) partly points in this direction by showing that productivity is 
higher in parliamentary than in presidential democracies. However, this effect does not hold 
for other indicators of government activity. This may be due to the fact that the prediction 
offered here only holds for certain combinations of f and g in our model, while the opposite 
prediction emerges for other combinations.  
  Second, term limits represent political institutions with a direct link to the time horizon 
T. While some authors have deduced arguments in favour of restricting reelection possibilities 
by term limits (e.g. Dick and Lott 1993; Reed et al. 1998; Smart and Sturm 2004), our analy-
sis suggests that this could lead to weaker policy outcomes in democracy, because the time-
horizon of politicians, respectively parties are shortened. Again, however, the results are con-
ditional on the values for f and g. This might explain the mixed evidence on the effect of term 
limits. While for the United States term limits seem to have had a significant effect on the 
quality of policy (e.g. Besley and Case 2003, 1995; Crain and Tollison 1993; List and Sturm  
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2004), the evidence for cross sections of countries is mixed (e.g. Dalle Nogare and Ricciuti 
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Game begins at period t = 1 
Period t begins. 
Stage Activities  Additional  information 
1  The parties choose 
A
t η  resp. 
B
t η simultaneously  platforms 
2  Voters make their decision (given 
A
t η , 
B
t η , 
A
t ψ , 
B
t ψ )  distribution of votes;  
election winner 
3  The election winner pursues the policies offered in 
the election (ηt)  
at(ηt) 
4  Voters update their expected valence for round t+1  A
t 1 + ψ , 
B
t 1 + ψ  
 
Period t ends. 
(equivalent to the start of period t+1 as long as t+1 < T) 
Game ends at period t = T
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Figure 3: Subgame perfect NE for T=2 when x=0 and when x=A
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Figure 4: Comparison of the subgame perfect NE in the case T=2 and T=3, when x=A
+ in the 
two-dimensional (f, g)-space 
 
 




A 1. The payoff notation 
To simplify notation, we denote the payoffs of the 16 possible strategies by  k P,   
{ } k1 , 2 , , 1 6 = … . The payoffs correspond with the 16 possible permutations of the vector 
() yyyy ,,, ηηηη, with  { } yI , I I = . We define: 
1 P : Payoff when () IIII ,,, ηηηη  
2 P : Payoff when () IIII I ,,, η ηηη  
3 P : Payoff when () III II ,,, ηηηη  
4 P : Payoff when () III II I ,,, ηηηη  
5 P : Payoff when () II III ,,, η ηηη 
6 P : Payoff when () II III I ,,, ηηηη  
7 P : Payoff when () II II II ,,, ηηηη 
8 P : Payoff when () II II II I ,,, ηηηη 
9 P  : Payoff when () I IIII ,,, ηηηη 
10 P : Payoff when () I IIII I ,,, ηηηη  
11 P : Payoff when () I III II ,,, ηηηη 
12 P : Payoff when () I III II I ,,, ηηηη 
13 P : Payoff when () II II I I ,,, ηηηη 
14 P : Payoff when () II II I II ,,, ηηηη 
15 P : Payoff when () II II II I ,,, ηηηη 
16 P : Payoff when () II II II II ,,, ηηηη 
 
A 2. Proofs 
Remark to the proofs: In the following stage 1 is the first election, stage 2 the second, and 
stage 3 the third. 
Proof of Proposition 2: We solve the game by backwards induction. Stage 2 represents a 
subgame that is equal to Game 1. Hence playing strategy  I η  is optimal for both parties. 
Therefore, we only need to deduce payoff vectors  1 P,   5 P,   9 P and  13 P  for the subgame at stage 
1. If  ()
AB
tt g0 Ψ− Ψ =, we obtain:
 
 
  () 11 3 PP 1 , 1 ==  
  () 5 P1 f g ,  1 f g =+ − − + 
  () 9 P1 f g ,  1 f g =− + + − 
Here, the first  (second) term is the payoff of party A (B). Setting these payoffs into the payoff 
matrix of Game 1, we can solve the subgame at stage 1. Comparing party A’s payoffs of these 
payoff vectors, platform II η is the dominant strategy, if g f > . Otherwise, the dominant strat-
egy is playing  I η . Since the payoffs of party A and B are mirror-inverted, the same holds for  
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party B. Therefore, in equilibrium both parties choose  II η  if gf > and  I η  if g < f in election 
1.   ⁫ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: We solve the game by backwards induction. Following Lemma 1 
both parties know that the equilibrium of the residual subgame at stage 2 is () II , ηη . There-
fore, only payoff vectors  1 P,   5 P,   9 P and  13 P  are relevant for subgame-perfection at stage 1. If 
()
AB





1 P1 g 2 g , 1 g 2 g =+ − − +
 
  () 5 P1 f , 1 f =+ − 
  () 9 P1 f 2 g , 1 f 2 g =− + + −  
  ()
22
13 P1 g 2 g , 1 g 2 g =+ + − −  
Setting these payoffs into the payoff matrix of Game 1, we can solve the subgame at stage 1. 
Comparing party A’s payoffs of these vectors, platform  II η is the dominant strategy, if 
fg ( 1 2 g ) <+, otherwise  I η  is the dominant strategy of party A. For party B,  II η is the domi-
nant strategy, if f g(1 2g) <− and, otherwise,  I η  is the dominant strategy. ⁫ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: If   ()
AB




1 P1 g 2 g , 1 g 2 g =− + + −  
  () 5 P1 f 2 g , 1 f 2 g =+ − − +  
  () 9 P1 f , 1 f =− + 
   ()
22
13 P1 g 2 g , 1 g 2 g =− − + +  
                                                 
9
 To deduce the payoffs given in vectors P1, P5, P9 and P13, use (13) to (19). For instance, the payoff of party A in 
P1 is () () () () ()
2 11 11 1
22 22 2 gg gg g 1 g 2 g +++ −+− += + − . That is, in election 2 the probability that party A has a 
valence disadvantage (because of winning election 1 and pursuing  I η ) is ( )
1
2 g + , and with counter-probability 
()
1
2 g −  is looses election 1 and has a valence advantage in election 2 (because of party B is pursuing  I η ).  
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It is easy to see that this game is identical to the game discussed in the proof of Proposition 3, 
the only difference being that party A now has the valence disadvantage while party B has the 
valence advantage. Thus, the results are mirror-inverted.   ⁫ 
 
Proof of Proposition 5: We again solve the game by backwards induction. If no party dis-
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=+ Θ⋅ + Θ⋅
=++ Θ⋅
=−+ Θ⋅
=+ Θ⋅ + Θ⋅
 
To calculate payoff 
j
2(,A )
+ Θ⋅ , respectively 
j
2(,A )
− Θ⋅ , j {A,B} = , it is essential for party j to 
know which policy choice the other party will make in election 2, that is, at stage 2 of the 
game. Since one party possesses valence advantage g at stage 2, the subgame-perfect NE of 
the subgame at stage 2 is given in Proposition 3 or Proposition 4, depending on whether situa-
tion A
+ or A
- is realized: If   (1 2 ) f gg <−, both parties choose  II η  in election 2, irrespective 
of valence distribution. Now let B
+ denote the situation where party B has valence advantage 
g, and B
- denotes the case where party B face disadvantage –g; thus A
+ is identical to B
-, and 
vice versa. Then, we obtain 
j2
2(,j ) 1 g 2g
+ Θ⋅ =++  and 
j2
2(,j ) 1 g 2g
− Θ⋅ =−− . Setting the result-
ing payoffs into the payoff matrix of Game 1, we can solve the subgame at stage 1.  
 Platform  II η  is the dominant strategy of both parties in election 1, if 
II I I I
j,0 j,0
,, PP ηη η η >  and 
II II I II
j,0 j,0
,, PP ηη η η > . Due to symmetric payoff terms, it suffices to analyze the conditions for either 
party A or party B. (Note that 
BA
22 (,A ) (,A )
+ − Θ⋅ = Θ⋅  and 
BA
22 (,A ) (,A )
− + Θ⋅ = Θ⋅ .) The condi-
tions are met if  (1 2 ) f gg <+. Therefore, both parties’ dominant strategy in election 1 is  II η  
if (1 2 ) f gg <−.  
 If  (1 2 ) f gg >+, both parties choose  I η  in election 2. Thus,  
j2
2(,j ) 1 g 2g
+ Θ⋅ =+−  and 
j2
2(,j ) 1 g 2g
− Θ⋅ =−+ . Choosing  I η  in election 1 is the dominant strategy of both parties if 
II I II
j,0 j,0
,, PP ηη η η >  and 
II I I II I
j,0 j,0
,, PP ηη η η > . This holds if  (1 2 ) f gg >−. Because of  (1 2 ) f gg >+ this is 
always fulfilled and both parties’ dominant strategy in election 1 is  I η  if  (1 2 ) f gg >+.  
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 Finally,  if  (1 2 ) (1 2 ) gg f gg − << + , the parties’ policy choices in election 2 depend 
on whether they have a valence advantage or disadvantage. The party with  valence advantage 
g chooses  II η  in election 2 and the other  I η . Therefore 
j
2(,j ) 1 f 2g
+ Θ ⋅= − +  and 
j
2(,j ) 1 f 2g
− Θ⋅ =+− . Given these payoffs, the dominant strategy of party A and B is choosing 
II η  in election 1 if  f g < . Otherwise, both parties’ dominant strategy is choosing  I η . Hence, 
the three areas (for the size of variable f) reduce to the two conditions stated in Proposition 5. 
  ⁫ 
 
Proof of Corollary 1: Proposition 5 tells us that the subgame perfect outcome is () II II , ηη if 
f g <  and () II , ηη  if  f g > . To deduce the subgame perfect NE of the game we have to take 
account of Proposition 3 and Proposition 4. In both propositions the subgame perfect NE is 
() II II I I ,,, ηηηη if  (1 2 ) f gg <− and ( ) IIII ,,, η ηηη  if  (1 2 ) f gg >+. Therefore, the subgame 
perfect NE is () II II II II I I ,,,,, ηηηηηη if  (1 2 ) f gg < −  and ( ) IIIIII ,,,,, η ηηηηη if 
(1 2 ) f gg >+. However, if  () fg ( 1 2 g ) ,  g ( 1 2 g ) ∈− + , the outcome of the second and third 
stages is () I IIII ,,, ηηηη if party A wins the valence advantage but ( ) II III ,,, η ηηη if party B 
wins the advantage of valence. Given equal initial valence and equal dominant strategies at 
stage 1 of the game the chance of having valance advantage g at stage 2 is 50:50. It follows 
that the subgame perfect NE is () I II II IIII ,,,,, ηηηηηη or ( ) I II III III ,,,,, η ηηηηη, respectively 
with a probability of  1
2 , if  () fg ( 1 2 g ) , g ∈− . Moreover, the subgame perfect NE is 
() III IIII ,,,,, ηηηηηη or () IIII III ,,,,, ηηηηηη, respectively with a probability of  1
2 , if 
() fg , g ( 1 2 g ) ∈+ .  ⁫ 
 
Proof of Proposition 6: The relevant payoffs party A has to compare at stage 1 are given by:  
 






A,A A A 11 1





A,A A A 11 1
,2 2 22 2
Pg g ( , A ) g ( , A )
Pg f ( , A )
Pg f ( , A )









= + ++Θ ⋅ +−Θ ⋅
=+++ Θ⋅
=+−+ Θ⋅
=++ + Θ⋅ + − Θ⋅
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For party B, the corresponding payoffs are given by:  
 






B,B B B 11 1





B,B B B 11 1
,2 2 22 2
Pg g ( , B ) g ( , B )
Pg f ( , B )
Pg f ( , B )









= − +−Θ ⋅ ++Θ ⋅
=−−+ Θ⋅
=−++ Θ⋅
=−+ − Θ⋅ + + Θ⋅
 
Party A’s dominant strategy at stage 1 is  II η  if 




η ηη η >  and 




η ηη η > , while party 





η ηη η >  and 




η ηη η > . Again the payoffs at 
stage 1 depend on the subgame perfect NE of the subgame at stage 2, which is given in 
Proposition 3 and Proposition 4, so that three cases have to be distinguished.  
 If  (1 2 ) f gg <−, both parties will choose  II η  in election 2 in equilibrium and the out-
come of the subgame is P13. Thus 
j2
2(,j ) 1 g 2g
+ Θ⋅ =++  and 
j2
2(,j ) 1 g 2g
− Θ⋅ =−− . Given these 
payoffs, party A’s dominant strategy is  II η  in the first election if 
2 (1 4 4 ) f gg g <+ + . This 
always holds because of  (1 2 ) f gg <−.  Party B’s dominant strategy, in turn, is also  II η , if 
2 (1 4 ) f gg <− . This also always holds because of  (1 2 ) f gg < − . Thus, both parties’ domi-
nant strategy is  II η  at stage 1, if  (1 2 ) f gg <−.  
 If (1 2 ) f gg >+, we know that the payoffs of the subgame at stage 2 are given by P1 
and that both parties choose  I η  in election 2. It follows that 
j2
2(,j ) 1 g 2g
+ Θ⋅ =+−  and 
j2
2(,j ) 1 g 2g
− Θ⋅ =−+ . Given these payoffs, party A’s dominant strategy at stage 1 is  II η , if 
2 (1 4 ) f gg <− , while  II η  is party B’s dominant strategy, if 
2 (1 4 4 ) f gg g <− + . Both ine-
qualities are never fulfilled, since   (1 2 ) f gg >+. Thus, both parties’ dominant strategy is  I η  
at stage 1 if  (1 2 ) f gg >+. 
  Finally we have to investigate the case where  (1 2 ) (1 2 ) gg f gg − << + . Then, we 
know that the payoffs are given by P9, if party A has the valence advantage, and by P5, if 
party B has the valence advantage at stage 2. Hence, we obtain 
j
2(,j ) 1 f 2g
+ Θ ⋅= − +  and 
j
2(,j ) 1 f 2g
− Θ⋅ =+− . In this constellation, party A’s dominant strategy, given its initial va-






+ < . Party B’s dominant strategy, given its initial valence 






− > . Therefore, both parties’ dominant strategy is  II η , if  
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(1 2 )
1 (1 2 )
g
g gg f g
−
− −< < , but if 
(1 2 ) (1 2 )
(1 ) 1
g g
g g gf g
−+
−+ <<  party A chooses  II η  while party B 
chooses  I η . Moreover, both parties’ dominant strategy is  I η  if 
(1 2 )
1 (1 2 )
g
g gf g g
+
+ << + . It fol-
lows that outcome  II I (, ) ηη  at stage 1 is never an element of the subgame perfect NE. 
  ⁫ 
 
Proof of Corollary 2: Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 inform us about the subgame perfect 
NE of the subgame at stage 2. Proposition 6, in turn, informs us about the platforms in equi-
librium at stage 1. From Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 we know that the subgame perfect 
outcome of the final two elections is ( ) II II I I ,,, ηηηη if 
(1 2 )




− <−< . Therefore, the 
subgame perfect NE is () II II II II I I ,,,,, ηηηηηη if  (1 2 ) f gg < − . However, if 
() (1 2 ),  (1 2 ) f gg gg ∈− + , the subgame perfect NE depends on which party has valance ad-
vantage g at stage 2. Party A wins the first election with probability  1
2 g +  and plays the good 






− < , both parties choose  II η  at stage 1. 
Hence, if  ()
(1 2 )
(1 ) (1 2 ),  
g
g fg g g
−
− ∈− , with probability  1
2 g +  sequence ( ) I II II IIII ,,,,, ηηηηηη is 
the subgame perfect NE and with counter probability  1
2 g −  sequence ( ) I II III III ,,,,, η ηηηηη is 
the subgame perfect NE. When  ( )
( 12) ( 12)




−+ ∈ , we know that at stage 1 party A 
chooses  II η in equilibrium but party B  I η . Hence, party A will definitely keep its valence ad-
vantage at stage 2. It follows that the unique subgame perfect NE is ( ) I III IIII ,,,,, ηηηηηη. 






+ > . 
However, as long as  ()
(1 2g)
(1 g) f g , g(1 2g)
+
+ ∈+  we still obtain valence-contingent outcomes at 
stage 2. As both parties choose the populist platform, party A will have the valence disadvan-
tage –g with probability  1
2 g + . Therefore, in the area  ( )
(1 2g)
(1 g) f g , g(1 2g)
+
+ ∈+  the subgame 
perfect NE is () IIII III ,,,,, ηηηηηη with probability  1
2 g +  and ( ) III IIII ,,,,, η ηηηηη with 
counter probability  1
2 g − . Finally, if f g(1 2g) >+, the dominant strategy of both parties is 
choosing  I η  in all three elections.    ⁫ 
 